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 2 
The Effects of Market Competition and International Orientation on Management Control 
Systems’ Use by Emerging Market Public Listed Companies 
 
ABSTRACT  
 We examine the effects of market competition and international orientation on 
management control systems’ use by emerging market Public Listed Companies (PLCs). Our 
inquiry focuses specifically on China because this country is the world’s largest annual source of 
exports from among emerging market countries. We examine management control systems 
whose widespread use by Chinese PLCs has been documented by prior accounting research: 
formal procedures, strategic planning, approval procedures, budget targets, participative 
budgeting and performance evaluation. We provide empirical evidence that the association 
between two specific types of market competition (foreign entrants’ competition and customers’ 
buying power) and management control systems’ use depends on whether the PLCs compete 
predominantly in the domestic or international market. We discuss implications of our findings 
and provide some directions for future research. 
Keywords:  management control systems; foreign entrants’ competition; customers’ buying 
power; international orientation  
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The Effects of Market Competition and International Orientation on Management Control 
Systems’ Use by Emerging Market Public Listed Companies 
Introduction 
Economic growth and liberalization create enormous new opportunities for emerging 
economy firms. 1  In the accounting literature, researchers examined how emerging economy 
State-owned enterprises have modernized (including the use of management control systems) in 
part due to increasing market competition that is associated with the opening of the domestic 
market to global players. For example, China (Chow, Duh & Xiao, 2007; Firth 1996; Lin & Yu, 
2002; O’Connor, Chow & Wu, 2004; O’Connor, Deng & Luo, 2006),  India (Anderson & Lanen, 
1999; Joshi, 2001), South Africa (Luther & Longden, 2001), Poland (Szychta, 2002), and 
Estonia (Haldma & Laats, 2002).  
Findings of this research on the association between market competition and 
management control system use by emerging economy firms, however, are mixed. For example, 
O’Connor, Chow and Wu (2004) find no association between market competition, while some 
studies find a significant association (O’Connor, Deng, & Luo, 2006; Firth, 1996). These and 
other studies do not test whether the choice of MCS differ in firms which compete in the 
domestic market versus those that compete in both the domestic and foreign markets. Indeed, 
Anderson and Lanen (1999) propose that the association depends in part on the international 
orientation of the firm. The distinction of domestic versus international orientation is striking 
given the trend of the new millennium towards increasing internationalization of emerging 
economy firms. For example, market competition associated with (i.e., export) 
                                                 
1  An emerging market is defined as “a country that satisfies two criteria: a rapid pace of economic development, and 
government policies favoring economic liberalization and the use of a free-market system (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & 
Wright, 2000, p. 249). Examples of countries meeting this definition are China, India, Mexico, Poland, and South 
Africa. 
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internationalization, which, in the case of China as being the largest emerging economy, is 
reported to be over $100 billion in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2008:8).  
A typical way in which a firm’s strategy can be defined is in terms of the scale and scope 
of its international operations. International-oriented firms have a propensity to engage in export 
activities and to commit substantial resources to international operations (Welch & Luostarinen, 
1988, p. 36). Scholars suggest that firms who seek an internationalization (e.g., through exports) 
strategy stand to benefit from the opportunity to learn new product designs and marketing 
strategies associated with the needs of international markets (Francis & Collins-Dodd, 2000; 
Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000; Ireland, Hitt, Camp, & Sexton, 2001), to develop alliances with 
foreign businesses, as well as to achieve economies of scale (Kogut, 1985).   
We extend the empirical literature on the relationship between market competition—
which in this study includes both competition from foreign entrants as well as the customers’ 
buying power—and management control system hereafter MCSs) use by emerging market 
Public Listed Companies (hereafter PLCs) and explore the potentially moderating effects of the 
firms’ international orientation on this relation. We examine the impact of emerging market 
Chinese PLCs because they are a central vehicle to the Chinese governments’ most recent stage 
of economic reforms. China provides an ideal setting to examine how the international expansion 
of emerging market PLCs affect their MCSs’ use, especially given the Chinese PLCs’ latecomer 
disadvantage in the global stage, which is typically populated by dominant customer and 
distribution channels (Luo & Tung, 2007; Taylor, 2003). 2  
                                                 
2   We focus specifically on China’s emerging market for several important reasons. First, in the mid-1990s, China 
was already the largest outward investor among emerging market countries and the eighth largest foreign direct 
investment (FDI) outflow country in the world (World Bank, 1997). In 2006, China’s FDI outflows amounted to 
$16.1 billion, or a 32 percent growth over 2005. Second, in 2005 China became the third largest trading nation in 
the world (Liu & Roos, 2006), and is the largest emerging economy, with exports reported to be over $100 
billion in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2008:8). Third, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 2001 
opened the country to foreign investors, including those from major trading nations (China Business Review, 
2000), and provided impetus towards the global expansion of PLCs. The recent merger of China’s TCL 
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Against the above backdrop, we address the question: How do the Chinese PLCs’ 
international orientation and market competition affect their MCSs’ use? We argue that the effect of 
competition from foreign entrants on MCSs’ use by Chinese PLCs will be stronger for domestic-
oriented PLCs than for their international-oriented counterparts, as the former do not have 
alternative market opportunities abroad, which limits their ability to produce at lower cost (as a 
result of economies of scale) and/or to sell products in developed economies at higher margins. In 
contrast, international-oriented PLCs face a different type of market competition abroad in the form 
of customers’ buying power (i.e., the ability of customers to demand and/or set prices that are often 
below competitive levels for their suppliers), which allows for the exercise of significant market 
power by retailers and wholesalers (Noll, 2005; Porter, 1998).  
We argue that the effect of customers’ buying power on MCSs’ use is stronger for the 
international-oriented Chinese PLCs for at least two reasons. First, most of these firms rely on the 
advantages of low-cost domestic labor and focus primarily on sales growth through major retail 
chains and the supply of intermediate goods to original equipment manufacturers. Second, 
customers’ buying power creates additional pricing and cost pressures for the firms who are trying 
to maintain and grow their market share in the global market (Kelly & Gosman, 2000).   
 We use the firm as the unit of analysis and focus on MCSs whose widespread use by 
Chinese PLCs has been documented by prior accounting research: formal procedures, strategic 
planning, approval procedures, budget targets, participative budgeting and performance 
evaluation—as assessed by senior-level managers (i.e., profit-center managers in various 
divisions, branches, or unit and cost-center managers) (O’Connor et al., 2004; Merchant & Otley, 
2006). We provide evidence that the effects of competition from foreign entrants’ and customers’ 
                                                                                                                                                            
International Holdings (one of China’s leading manufacturer of multi-media consumer electronics) with France’s 
Thomson SA, owner of the RCA brand, as well as the acquisition of IBM’s personal computer division by 
Lenovo, highlight these trends. 
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buying power on the firms’ MCSs choice depend on their international orientation (domestic vs. 
international). We find that while competition from foreign entrants has a significantly positive 
impact on the firms’ MCSs’ use, this influence is greater for domestic-oriented firms relative to 
their international-oriented counterparts (specifically formal procedures, approval procedures, 
and participative budgeting and performance evaluation). Further, the level of customers’ buying 
power has a stronger effect on the firms’ MCSs’ use for international-oriented firms relative to 
their domestic-oriented counterparts.  
In what follows, we explain the management control system constructs and describe the 
context of the Chinese PLCs, including the international orientation construct and the main 
sources of competition faced both domestically and internationally. We then present a model of 
MCS antecedents. Next, we explain the methods used to test the model and describe our results. 
We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for research and practice, the 
study’s limitations, and provide some directions for future research. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Management Control Systems  
 Management control systems are a subset of organizational routines and are typically 
characterized as being recurrent, formalized, and information-based (Zollo & Winter, 2002). The 
primary goals of MCS are to provide and communicate information that is useful for decision-
making and strategic planning (Merchant & Otley, 2006), and to design and deploy appropriate 
performance evaluation and reward systems to attract, retain, and motivate qualified employees 
(Anthony & Govindarajan, 2001a, p. 59; Merchant, 1985).  
 Recent management accounting research has relied on economic and institutional theories to 
examine the antecedents and consequences of MCSs’ use by China’s PLCs.  In particular, 
O’Connor et al. (2004) find that joint venture experience and stock market listing are significantly 
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associated with the use of Western MCSs, including formal procedures, approval procedures 
(budget tightness), and quality control procedures, as well as budget and performance targets. 
O’Connor et al. (2006) find that the level of political influence in labor decisions mediates the 
effects of joint venture, market competition, and stock market listing on organization structure and 
performance measurement. Chow et al. (2007) find that the MCSs that have been most widely 
adopted by Chinese PLCs are strategic planning and budgeting systems.   
Consistent with this literature we focus on five dimensions of strategic planning and budget 
controls: formal procedures, strategic planning, approval procedures, budget targets, participative 
budgeting and performance evaluation. Together, these MCSs help to enhance firm performance in 
several ways.  First, formalization of procedures and strategic planning help to formalize the 
decision making process and to reduce manager decision error (O’Connor et al., 2004). Second, 
budget controls such as approval procedures and targets promote goal-congruent behavior and help 
managers to assign responsibilities and motivate personnel (Dyson & Foster, 1982). Third, 
participation in budget setting and performance evaluation facilitates delegation and learning 
through information exchange, which, in turn, can boost organizational adaptation, market 
responsiveness, and managerial motivation (Malina & Selto, 2001; Kren, 1992).3 
 The following discussion lays out the constructs that we examine in this study, namely, 
international orientation, competition from foreign entrants and customers’ buying power, and 
their expected association with MCSs’ use by Chinese PLCs. We use Figure 1 to guide our 
discussion hereafter. 
__________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
___________________________  
                                                 
3  The above discussion suggests that the benefits of MCSs should be higher when they are combined as a package 
(Chow, Kato, and Shields, 1994). Predictions about whether MCS are complements or substitutes for one another 
(e.g., see Widener, 2007; Anderson & Dekker, 2005) are beyond the scope of this study. 
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Competition from Foreign Entrants 
Foreign entrants in emerging economies enjoy several strategic competitive advantages, 
including, but not limited to: substantial financial resources, advanced information technologies 
in selling and marketing, superior products, brand leadership, seasoned marketing and 
management skills, and scientific management, among others (Taylor, 2003; Dawar & Frost, 
1999). Furthermore, most foreign entrants have majority control of joint ventures, which allows 
them to make independent strategic choices, to retain profits from joint venture operations, and 
to better integrate their global strategies (Taylor, 2003, p. 438).  
Competition from foreign entrants has resulted in two environmental challenges to 
Chinese PLCs: environmental uncertainty and environmental hostility. According to the 
information uncertainty perspective, problem non-routineness, complexity, and change affect the 
level of environmental uncertainty and hence the demand for information (Gordon & Narayanan, 
1984). Competition from foreign entrants brings about uncertainty by introducing product market 
dynamics (eg. product positioning, new products, product branding and promotion strategies), 
which generates a number of pressures on Chinese PLCs who are generally accustomed to 
having dominant positions in their emerging markets (Hu & Jefferson, 2002). These pressures 
include the increasing need to control costs, to supply higher-quality goods and services, and to 
meet uncertain levels of demand (Li 1997, p. 1101), among others. These pressures also 
negatively affect the survival rates of local firms (Chang & Xu, 2008).4  
Competition from foreign entrants is also a source of environmental hostility. According 
to resource dependence theory, environments affect organizations through the process of making 
available or withholding resources such as when firms face resource-advantaged competitors 
(Aldrich, 1979; Dess & Beard, 1984). Foreign entrants have advantages in technology, 
                                                 
4  See Gorg & Greenway (2004) for a review. 
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management expertise, and marketing know-how. Further, strategic global capabilities allow 
foreign entrants to compete more aggressively, especially in the case of firms that pursue market 
expansion strategies and need to attract and retain experienced personnel (Zhou, Li, and Tse, 
2002).  
The information demands associated with competition increase the value of gathering more 
timely cost, quality, and other non-financial information (Banker & Mashruwala, 2007; Davila & 
Foster, 2005; Krishnan, 2005; Li, 1997) through the use of MCS such as budget targets, 
participation in budget setting and performance evaluation.  Increasing formalization of procedures 
and budget targets provides senior managers with a set of accessible and objective standards against 
which to compare subordinates’ performance. Similarly, resource demands associated with hostility 
pressures from foreign entrants increase the value of using formal procedures, strategic planning, 
approval procedures and budget targets to control resources in decentralized team settings and to 
improve the quality of managers’ decision.  
To illustrate, O’Connor, et al.(2004, p.358) report the following quote from a senior manager 
of an SOE, “Pressure to increase sales and to decrease costs has forced management to formalize 
the use of management teams to make decisions in the areas of production quality, cost evaluation, 
sales and financial management.”  Further, O’Connor, et al. (2006) find an association between 
foreign entrant competition and the use of objective performance measures in the incentive system. 
Based on the above discussion, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1a.  The association between the level of foreign entrants’ competition and the level of 
MCSs’ use by Chinese PLCs is positive. The MCSs include formal procedures, strategic 
planning, approval procedures, budget targets, participative budgeting and performance 
evaluation. 
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While the strength of foreign entrants’ competition is an important consideration, managers 
of emerging market PLCs also need to evaluate the degree to which the PLCs’ assets are 
transferable internationally (Dawar & Frost, 1999, p. 121). For domestic-oriented PLCs, whose 
assets are not transferable internationally, the firm needs to concentrate on defending its turf against 
foreign entrants. For instance, when a new foreign product brand first appears in China, sales are 
initially high owing to the consumers’ curiosity to try the new brand. Yet Chinese competitors often 
respond by launching products with similar features. Although the foreign brands are characterized 
by higher quality/higher price, the manufacturers seldom have a technological monopoly. Thus, 
domestic-oriented PLCs are more likely to respond to the foreign entrants’ competition by acquiring 
or replicating the technology to make similar products at a lower cost, a strategy that often works 
because consumers are willing to trade off quality for price (Liu & Roos, 2006, p. 440). As the 
competitive pressures from foreign entrants increase, the PLCs’ ability to compete will hinge on 
whether they can restructure around the strongest links of their value chain to maximize their return 
on assets and return on investments in quality (Hu & Jefferson, 2002).   
For international-oriented Chinese PLCs whose assets are more transferable to foreign 
markets, the opportunity to compete globally with the multinational firms is real (Liu & Roos, 
2006; Dawar & Frost, 1999, p. 121); as such, the direct influence of foreign entrants’ 
competition is likely to be lower.5 Typically, most Chinese PLCs still rely on the advantages of 
low-cost domestic labor and concentrate primarily on growing sales through major retail chains 
(e.g., Wal-Mart, J.C. Penney), and by supplying intermediate goods to original equipment 
manufacturers (e.g., Acer, Dell, Hewlett Packard) (Li, 2009). Contrary to popular opinion, only a 
limited number of the large-scale Chinese PLCs have the human and capital resources and 
                                                 
5  Dawar & Frost (1999, p. 122) develop a matrix consisting of four positioning strategies for emerging-market firms. 
A firm’s position in the matrix (i.e., defenders, extenders, dodgers, or contenders) depends on both the transferability 
of its competitive assets and the pressures to globalize in the industry. 
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knowhow to compete successfully with multinational firms. For instance, TCL International 
Holdings’ financial strength has enabled the company to buy foreign software and core 
technologies, to invest their profits into research and development, and to match the advertising 
expenditure of foreign competitors (Liu & Roos, 2006, p. 441).  In a study of Indian SOEs, 
Anderson and Lanen (1999) find that the association between market competition and 
management control system use depends in part on the international orientation of the firm.   
The above discussion suggests that, as the level of foreign entrants’ competition increases, 
domestic-oriented Chinese PLCs need to engage in more complex forward-looking activities to 
maintain or enhance their competitive position through both cost and cycle time reductions and 
quality improvement efforts, relative to their internationally-oriented counterparts (Raith, 2003, 
2005; Hu & Jefferson, 2002; Kole & Lehn, 1999; Lawless & Finch 1989, p. 354; Dess & Beard 
1984, p. 56). Thus, the value of using MCSs such as strategic planning, tighter budgets, participative 
budget setting, and strategic performance measurement systems will be higher for domestic-oriented 
Chinese PLCs than for internationally-oriented PLCs. Based on the above discussion, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
H1b. The effect of foreign entrants’ competition on the level of MCSs’ use by Chinese PLCs 
is stronger for domestic-oriented PLCs than for international-oriented PLCs. The MCSs 
include formal procedures, strategic planning, approval procedures, budget targets, 
participative budgeting and performance evaluation. 
Customers’ Buying Power 
Customers’ buying power is a major force that shapes the international expansion of 
emerging market firms. Customers’ buying power is driven primarily by their size and by their 
  10 
location in the value chain.6 Customer buying power includes both their negotiation power, 
which is associated with both their control over market distribution resources, as well as with 
their financial resources (Noll, 2005). In many industries in which intermediaries play an 
important role in the value chain, customers’ buying power is often higher at the distribution 
level than at the manufacturing level of the value chain (Raff & Schmitt, 2008). Not surprisingly, 
large customers are major participants in the global value chains. For instance, Wal-Mart alone 
imports more than half of its non-food products from China (Smith, 2004) and accounts for more 
than 15 percent of total U.S. imports from that country (Basker & Van, 2008). Large customers 
also have an information advantage over their smaller counterparts. This advantage enables them 
to source a larger range of alternative suppliers, especially directly at the factory level rather than 
through an export agent stationed in major cities. As such, they can do away with the middle 
man and place greater price pressure on the Chinese manufacturers.  
Chinese PLCs face pressures from their international customers, who typically use their 
buying power to demand prices that are profitable to them but often below competitive levels for 
their suppliers (Noll, 2005, Porter, 1998). In turn, this creates pricing and cost pressures for 
Chinese PLCs who are struggling to maintain their market share (Kelly & Gosman, 2000). As 
the level of customers’ buying power increases, so does the need for international-oriented 
Chinese PLCs to choose their markets carefully and to maintain their low-cost advantage through 
continuous improvement and quality control efforts (Hart, 1995). Indeed, international-oriented 
PLCs typically have a few dominant customers that, at a minimum, squeeze their Chinese 
suppliers on price and, at the extreme, mandate new processes and technologies (Grant, 2002). 
Squeezing their emerging market partners on price is prevalent with international customers 
                                                 
6  The value chain for any firm is the linked set of value-creating activities of which it is a part, from acquiring the basic 
raw materials for component suppliers to making the ultimate end-use product and delivering it to the final 
consumers (Anthony & Govindarajan, 2001d, p. 310). 
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owing to emerging market partners’ expansion strategies that are based predominantly on using a 
low-cost advantage (Baack & Boggs, 2008; Chittoor & Ray, 2007). In turn, these cost pressures 
increase the value of gathering more timely cost information for strategic planning and budget 
setting.  
Also, as the level of customers’ buying power increases, so does the pressure on 
international-oriented Chinese PLCs to conform to their customers’ product design and quality 
demands. Thus, the need to manage capacity, the timing of orders, and the scheduling of deliveries 
to key customers (Li, 1997; Abernethy & Lillis, 1995) increases the information-processing 
requirements for these firms. For example, having a comprehensive data gathering and processing 
system is important to ensure that raw materials and sub-assemblies are supplied as needed 
(Memedovic, Ojala, Rodriguez, & Naula, 2008). These information demands, in turn, require the 
use of more formal procedures, strategic planning, approval procedures to control the decision 
making processes, and information exchange mechanisms such as participation in budget setting 
(Davila & Foster, 2005, p. 1044; Chenhall, 2005). As a key customer’s buying power increases, so 
does the risk of losing the customer to a competitor. In turn, this risk creates further pressures for the 
Chinese PLCs to maintain a certain level of trust and commitment with key customers through 
effective communication, planning, and mutual performance reviews (Puan, 1997).  
In contrast, for domestic-oriented PLCs, customers’ buying power is typically characterized 
by informal relationships between Chinese wholesalers and retailers. Buyer-supplier relationships 
rely less on formal contracts that stipulate various quantity and quality requirements (Chen, 1995). 
As the domestic-oriented PLCs’ customers are also likely to be Chinese (e.g., Chinese firms still 
dominate downstream manufacturing and retail spaces), there is lower pressure to squeeze the 
Chinese PLCs on price due to reputation concerns. Indeed, domestic buyer-supplier relationships 
are characterized by guanxi-type cooperation which includes a resistance against seeking short-term 
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alternatives (eg. price gouging) to long term relationships (Lovett, Simmons & Kali, 1999).  A 
customer may have fewer alternative suppliers to switch to once its reputation for price gouging is 
known as reputation concerns play a larger role in contractual dealings. In addition, the demand for 
high-quality raw materials or sub-assemblies is lower relative to the demands placed by large 
international customers. Therefore, the information demands, cost and relationship risk pressures, 
which otherwise drive the need for more MCSs, are lessened for domestic-oriented Chinese PLCs. 
Based on this discussion, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2. The effect of customers’ buying power on the level of MCSs’ use by Chinese PLCs is 
stronger for international-oriented PLCs than for domestic-oriented PLCs. These MCSs 
include formal procedures, strategic planning, approval procedures, budget targets, 
participative budgeting and performance evaluation. 
 
Research Method 
We collected data from both archival and survey-based sources. We collected the former 
from the annual reports of the Chinese PLCs in our sample and from the financial and market 
data compiled by the CSMAR database. To collect the latter, we carried out a comprehensive 
survey of the senior- and middle-level managers of Chinese PLCs (explained in more detail 
below).  
Design of Survey Instruments 
We designed two surveys, one for senior-level managers and one for middle- level 
managers. We draw our measures for the variables examined in our model (reproduced in Table 
2) from the senior managers’ responses because this is consistent with the level of analysis in our 
study. We use the responses from the middle-level managers for validation purposes (discussed 
below). We considered several issues in the survey design. First, to construct our measures we 
relied on both the management (e.g., Labroukos, Lioukas & Chambers, 1995; Govindarajan, 
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1988; Pascale, 1985) and management accounting literatures (e.g., Moores & Yuen, 2001; Chow, 
Shields, & Wu, 1999; Chow et al., 1996; Merchant, 1989, 1985). Second, consistent with 
Dillman’s (1978, 1999) total design method, we composed preliminary drafts of the instruments 
in English and then revised them several times. We then hired a professional translator to 
translate the instruments from English into Chinese. Next, one of the co-authors and another 
Chinese accounting professor, both of whom are bilingual, performed back-translation from 
Chinese to English to ensure that the original meaning had been preserved.  
We then pilot-tested the Chinese-version instruments with several objectives in mind:  
(1) to ensure that they were clear and could be easily understood by the respondents; (2) to 
identify and rectify any problems with the questions; and (3) to ensure that they conveyed the 
same meaning as did the English version. We adopted a two-step process for these pilot tests. 
First, we contacted two companies and interviewees through the China Accounting and Finance 
Research (CAFR) Center, which is headquartered in mainland China. We conducted personal 
interviews with four respondents from each company, two senior-level and two middle-level 
managers. As a result of these interviews, we fine-tuned the instruments. For the second step, we 
sent the revised instruments to two doctoral students, who at the time worked at the CAFR 
Center, for their comments and suggestions, and we then fine-tuned the instruments once again.  
Survey administration 
We use a randomly selected sample of firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges. Consistent with Dillman (1978, 1999), we first contacted the chief executive officers 
(CEOs) of these companies by phone and invited them to participate in the study. We informed 
them that to increase the internal validity of our findings the study required four respondents 
from each company—two senior-level managers and two middle-level managers—because a 
single individual often cannot reasonably reflect the beliefs of an entire organization (Young, 
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1996).7 We mailed a set of four survey booklets to each of the 680 companies in our target 
population, and three weeks later we mailed a second wave of surveys to non-respondents and 
made follow-up phone calls to all second-wave recipients.8  
Respondents – Senior-level managers 
We received surveys from 183 companies, for a response rate of 26.9 percent. We 
discarded 14 firms that either returned incomplete survey sets or failed to follow our instructions. 
To reduce potential noise in our data, we excluded a further 15 firms that were either 
government-protected or operated in closely controlled industries. 9 Thus, our sample used to test 
our hypotheses consists of 154 firms, with surveys returned by 308 senior-level managers. Panel 
A of Table 1 summarizes our sample, and Panel B shows the results of the tests of non-response 
bias.  
We tested for potential non-response bias in two ways. First, our survey sample (n = 154) 
of respondent firms are not significantly different, in terms of industry, from our target 
population of firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (Chi-square = 26.19; 
p = 0.26). The industries are also similarly represented between domestic- and international-
oriented firms (discussed later). The note to Table 1 shows the sample distribution by SIC two-
digit code and industry name. Second, we conducted tests of differences in means (medians) for 
the variables related to sales, net income, number of employees, and age, and find no evidence of 
differences between respondents and non-respondents (see Table 1, Panel B). Finally, we find no 
evidence of differences in sales, net income, age and size between early and late respondents.   
                                                 
7   The CEO, who was also a participant, selected three other managers for the study. Arguably, this practice may 
introduce sampling bias due to the possibility that the contact person may channel the surveys only to employees 
with favorable views. However, our empirical tests show no evidence of systematic biases associated with the 
variables in our models. 
8    By the end of 2003, there were 759 public companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 500 public 
companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, for a total of 1,259 firms. We excluded 376 non-manufacturing 
companies and 203 companies that were listed after 2001, leaving us with a sample of 680 firms.  
9   These included firms in the steel making, telecommunications, and mining industries. Twenty-four different industry 
codes are represented in our sample. 
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The respondents represent a wide range of managerial functions, with more than half of 
them reporting involvement in accounting/finance and administration. The senior-level managers 
had an average age of 45 years and an average length of employment with the company of 11.61 
years (s.d. = 8.11). More importantly, taken together, these means also suggest that our 
respondents had sufficiently adequate knowledge about their companies to answer the survey 
questions. The majority of respondents reported having a college degree or some college 
education, and of these, 35 percent of senior managers and 17 percent of middle managers 
reported having a post-graduate degree.10  
 
_________________________ 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
__________________________ 
 
Operational Constructs 
 
Management Control Systems  
We constructed our MCSs variables based on managers’ responses to the survey 
instruments by summing the respective items comprising each variable.11 These measures reflect 
the MCSs in use at the sample firms as of the start of 2004. Table 2 summarizes the operational 
MCSs constructs along with the results of the confirmatory factor analysis. 
Formal procedures (MCS_FORM). Formalization of planning is an aggregate measure used by 
Labroukos et al. (1995) that combines the responses from senior-level managers to four 
                                                 
10  We compared the participants’ responses across all of the items in the survey and across all of the firms in our 
sample. The mean responses between each pair of senior managers are not significantly different (p > 0.10). 
Further, our hypotheses test results are qualitatively similar regardless of whether we use the average of the two 
responses or the disaggregated responses. Therefore, our results are based on the average responses of each pair 
of senior-level managers. 
11   Our results are qualitatively similar when we use factor based scores for each of the MCS variables instead. 
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questions about the extensiveness of use of rules, policies, and procedures to govern various 
strategic and operational decisions in the firm (see Table 2).    
Strategic planning (MCS_PLAN). We constructed the strategic planning measures shown in 
Table 2 from the senior-managers’ responses to six questions on strategic and operational 
planning in terms of extensiveness and detail (Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975). The Cronbach’s 
alpha (Cronbach 1951) for strategic planning is 0.82.  
Approval procedures (MCS_TIGHT) and Budget targets (MCS_TARGET).  We constructed 
the two budget control measures shown in Table 2 from senior managers’ responses to 11 
questions on budget targets and tightness (Chow, Kato, & Merchant, 1996; Merchant, 1985). The 
Cronbach’s alpha for budget targets and tightness is 0.87 and 0.78, respectively.  
Participative budgeting and performance evaluation (MCS_PART). This variable includes 
seven questions elicited from middle-level managers related to the use of participation in budget 
setting (4 items) and performance evaluation (3 items) from Chow et al. (1999). The overall 
Cronbach alpha is 0.87 (see Table 2). 
Competition from Foreign Entrants, Customers’ Buying Power, and International Orientation  
Competition from foreign entrants. We construct our proxy (denoted by FGN_COMP) from 
the industry data provided by the China Statistical Bureau. We sourced the data from the China 
Statistical Yearbook, available at www.chinadataonline.com. We used the percentage of foreign 
firm sales in each industry in 2003.12 Studies on the effects of foreign entrants’ competition on 
domestic firms from FDI have used the same proxy (Hu & Jefferson, 2002). 
Customer buying power.  We constructed our customer buying power variable (denoted by 
CUSTOMER) as the percentage of sales, out of total firm sales, that a firm made to its five 
                                                 
12  Researchers have used other proxies, such as indicator variables for special economic zones or the market 
development index (Fan & Wang, 2004), but such proxies are one step removed from the foreign entrants’ 
competition construct we employ herein. 
  17 
largest customers in 2003. Higher levels of this index indicate higher levels of customer buying 
power. We construct our proxy from the annual report disclosures that are required by generally 
accepted accounting principles in China. These standards mandate the disclosure of the 
percentage of a firm’s sales, out of its total sales, that are made to its five largest customers.13 
International orientation. Consistent with the international economics literature, a firm’s 
domestic versus international orientation (denoted EXPORT_DUM) is based on the magnitude of 
its export sales (Sullivan, 1994). We use an indicator variable to denote either a domestic-
oriented firm (coded as 0 for zero export sales) or an international-oriented firm (coded as 1 if 
export sales are equal to, or exceed 25 percent of total sales) based on the average percentage of 
export sales for the years 2002-2004 (Koster & Karlsson, 2009). The international business 
literature uses 25 percent of export sales as a benchmark for determining whether a firm has an 
international orientation (Koster & Karlsson, 2009).  
Firm- and Industry-Specific Characteristics (Control Variables) 
We control for six firm-level variables and one industry-level variable to statistically 
remove their potential effects on the firms’ MCSs’ use. At the firm level, we control for export 
intensity, export experience, joint venture experience, manufacturer or retail customer, 
government ownership and size. We control for export intensity and export experience because 
these factors have been documented in theories of internationalization that examine the 
determinants of export performance (see Singh, 2009 for a review). Thus, we expect more 
export-intensive and export-experienced firms to have higher use of MCSs. We measure the 
firms’ export intensity (denoted EXPORT) in terms of the average percentage of export sales out 
of total sales for the years 2002-2004. We measure the firms’ export experience (denoted 
                                                 
13  This is similar to the customer concentration data mandated by SFAS No. 14 and used by Balakrishnan, Linsmeier, 
& Venkatachalam (1996). The only difference is that SFAS No. 14 requires such disclosure of customers only when 
they account for more than ten percent of a firm’s annual sales. 
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EXPORT_YRS) using the number of years they have been in the export business (Singh, 2009). 
We control for joint venture experience because both Firth (1996) and O’Connor et al. (2004) 
find that Chinese SOEs that enter into joint ventures with foreign partners make greater use of 
the more detailed and newer ‘Western’ management accounting mechanisms, relative to SOEs 
without such joint venture partners. We use a dummy variable (denoted JV) coded as 1 if the 
firm currently has joint venture experience with a foreign partner, and 0 otherwise. We control 
for the firm’s position in the value chain (i.e., whether the firm’s customer is a manufacturer or 
retailer) because this factor has been documented by the globalization literature as being 
associated with the amount of bargaining power a firm may have over the terms of a transaction 
(Gereffi and Kaplinsky, 2001). Based on information taken from annual reports, we use an 
indicator variable (denoted BTB) coded 1 if the firm mainly sells to other manufacturers and 0 if 
the firm mainly sells direct to retailers. 
Government ownership research suggests that the effective modernization of public firms 
is largely dependent on the extent to which employment control rights are transferred from 
government to management in the process of corporatization (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994, p. 1015). 
Recent research provides empirical evidence of government interference in PLCs’ domestic and 
international operations (Wang, 2003) in the form of senior management appointments, 
preferential commercial treatment of inter-organizational relationships, as well as providing 
special benefits such as financial bailouts and low-interest rate loans for international-oriented 
firms (Tian & Estrin, 2007). We construct an indicator variable (denoted STATE) coded as 1 if 
the firm’s dominant shareholder is a private institutional investor, and coded as 0 if the firm’s 
dominant shareholder is the State.14  
                                                 
14  With regard to the shareholding structure of the listed firms, other types of shareholders, including legal-person 
shares, A-shares, and B-shares, have the ability to influence firm structure and operations. Our results are 
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We control for size (denoted SIZE) because larger firms are more likely to benefit from 
the more extensive use of MCSs than are smaller firms (Christie et al., 2003). At the same time, 
larger firms carry greater political costs through employment responsibility, which may limit any 
said benefits (e.g., cost reduction through downsizing) (Lin, Cai, & Li, 1998). We proxy for firm 
size by using the average of the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of years 2002 and 
2003. Finally, at the industry level, we control for industry growth (denoted GROWTH) using the 
average annual growth in industry sales for the five years (1999-2003) (Dess & Beard, 1984).15  
_________________________ 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
__________________________ 
Sample Validity and Reliability 
Table 2 reports our confirmatory factor analyses for the MCSs survey completed by our 
sample of senior- and middle-level managers. Further, we conducted the following validity test 
of multiple raters and multiple sources (Podsakoff, McKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990). We 
tested the validity of the participative budgeting and performance evaluation measure by eliciting 
responses from the middle-level managers to the same questions that we elicited from the senior-
level managers. The correlation in the responses between the two managerial ranks is positive 
and highly significant (0.350; p < 0.01).  
A domestic/international orientation is also associated with a domestic/international 
customer orientation to the extent that export sales comprise at least 25% of total sales and that 
the firm’s major customers are foreign manufacturers and retailers. As such we adopt this 
multiple criterion (export sales and major customer being a foreign customer) to describe an 
internationally oriented firm in our study. To the extent that export sales are made to foreign 
                                                                                                                                                            
qualitatively similar when we include these shareholder types. Our analyses do not include employee shares, H-
shares, N-shares, and L-shares due to their minor quantitative importance. 
15  We sourced the data from the China Statistical Yearbook, available at www.chinadataonline.com. 
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manufacturers and retailers, a firm’s domestic vs. international orientation may also be 
associated with having their largest customers with a predominantly domestic vs. international 
orientation. While there is agreement in the international business literature that 25 percent 
export sales is a reasonable cut-off point for determining whether a firm has an international vs. 
domestic orientation, one may argue that more dimensions of international orientation may be 
warranted. Thus, we examine whether the firms’ dominant customers are systematically different 
between those that fall above the 25 percent export sales cut-off and those that fall below this 
cut-off. Thus, we validate whether export sales is associated with the type of customer.  
We also gathered data on whether the firms’ largest five customers are domestic or 
foreign. To do so we called each of the 74 firms that had export sales (see Table 1) and received 
responses from 53 firms (34 firms out of the 41 firms who exported between 0 and 25 percent of 
sales and 19 firms out of 33 firms who exported more than 25 percent of sales.16 All of the 
respondents from the firms with less than 25 percent export sales indicated their largest five 
customers were domestic firms. For the firms with more than 25 percent export sales, in 14 out 
of 19 cases (73.7%), at least three of their largest five customers were foreign firms. While this 
approach is admittedly ad hoc, taken together, these findings provide some reassurance about the 
validity of our assumptions about the international orientation construct, as discussed above. 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for all of the variables examined in our study, 
and Table 4 presents pair-wise Pearson correlations for our MCSs, independent, and control 
variables. Table 3 shows that the level of use of MCSs is not significantly different between the 
                                                 
16 The phone interviews were directed initially toward the sales office or the investor relations officer (in many cases 
this was the first accessible phone number provided by the companies). On contacting the firm, we asked to speak to 
the sales manager or representative. The interviews followed a prescribed protocol with the questions – During the 
past five years, were any of your five largest customer’s foreign firms? If so, How many? And were these firms part 
of your export sales? The phone calls were undertaken in 2009 over a two month period. 
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two groups of firms ((p < 0.05).17 International-oriented firms have mean overseas sales of 
43.08%. The table also shows that, on average, the ratio of each firm’s sales to its five largest 
customers relative to total sales (CUSTOMER) in 2003 is 28.27% (29.16%) for the international- 
(domestic-) oriented firms, and foreign firm sales (FGN_COMP) in the same year accounted for 
about 19% of total sales across the industries in our sample. On average, State shareholders held 
39 percent of the shares in our sample firms.  
______________________________ 
 
Insert Table 3 and Table 4 about here 
______________________________ 
Regression Model 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we construct the following regression model, which we 
run separately for each of our five MCSs: 
MCS1….5 =  β0  + β1 FGN_COMP it + β2 CUSTOMER it + β3 INT_ORIENT it + β4 EXPORT%it  
 + β5 EXPORT_YRSit  + β6 JV it + β7 BTB it + β8 STATE it + β9 SIZE it  + β10GROWTH it   
 + β11 (INT_ORIENT it * FGN_COMP it)  + β12 (INT_ORIENT it * CUSTOMER it) + eit.     (1) 
 
where for firm i in period t: 
i Represents the individual firms in our sample, 1 - 154. 
MCS1….5 
 
 
The five MCSs: formal procedures, strategic planning, approval 
procedures, budget targets, participative budgeting and performance 
evaluation. 
FGN_COMP Foreign entrants’ competition: the percentage of foreign firm’s sales 
revenue, out of total industry revenue, in each of China’s domestic 
industries using the two-digit CSMAR code (2003). 
CUSTOMER  Customers’ buying power: the percentage of sales, out of total firm sales, 
made to the five largest customers of each firm in 2003. The higher the 
index, the higher is the level of customers’ buying power  (source: 
CSMAR database). 
INT_ORIENT Domestic vs. international orientation: we use an indicator variable to 
denote that the firm is either domestic-oriented, that is, has no export sales 
                                                 
17  Since we are comparing two groups of firms (domestic- vs. international-oriented), we tested for the differences in 
the industry representation between these two groups.  We report the results of a Chi-square test that indicates that 
the representation of industries across the two groups is not significantly different (Chi-square = 15.71; p = 0.87).   
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(coded as 0), or international-oriented, with export sales exceeding 25% of 
total sales (coded as 1), based on the average percentage of the firm’s 
export sales for the year 2002-2003. We use this variable for modeling the 
interaction terms in equation 1 (source: CSMAR database). 
 EXPORT% Export intensity: the average percentage of overseas sales, out of the 
firm’s total sales, for the year 2003 (source: CSMAR database). 
EXPORT_YRS 
 
Number of years since the firm began exporting (source: CSMAR 
database). 
JV Joint venture experience - coded as 1 if the firm currently has joint venture experience with a foreign partner and 0 otherwise. 
BTB Firm i’s main customers– coded 1 if the firm sells mainly to manufacturers and 0 if the firm sells mainly to retailers. 
STATE Government ownership: we use an indicator variable to denote whether 
the firm’s major shareholder is either a private institutional investor 
(coded as 1), or the government (coded as 0) at the end of 2003 (source: 
CSMAR database). 
SIZE Based on the average natural log of total assets at the end of 2002 and 2003. 
GROWTH 
 
Industry growth: based on the average annual industry sales growth 
between 1999 and 2003 (source: China Statistical Yearbook). 
 
Results 
Hypotheses Tests 
Recall that Hypothesis 1a predicts that the higher the foreign entrants’ competition, the 
higher the level of MCSs’ use by Chinese PLCs. H1b predicts that the effect of foreign entrants’ 
competition on the level of MCSs’ use by Chinese PLCs is stronger for domestic-oriented PLCs 
than for international-oriented PLCs. H2 predicts that the effect of customers’ buying power on the 
level of MCSs’ use by Chinese PLCs is stronger for international-oriented PLCs than for domestic-
oriented PLCs. The regression model in Table 5 includes the independent and control variables as 
well as the interaction terms. Each of the adjusted R2 (range from .17, p<.01 to .27, p<.01) are 
significantly (p<.10) higher than each adjusted R2 (range from .07, p<.01 to 0.17, p<.01) of the 
main-effects model that includes the independent and control variables but not the interaction 
terms.18.Multicollinearity is not a problem as evidenced by the largest VIF of 7.47 and the largest 
                                                 
18  Given the different industries represented by the sample, we employ Huber-White robust standard errors with the 
cluster command to control for the sample dependence around the industry in which each firm is located (Rogers, 
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condition index value of 35.88, which are within the accepted limits (Belsley, 1991). The residuals 
of the model are normally distributed. 
______________________________ 
 
Insert Table 5 and Table 6 about here 
______________________________ 
 
Consistent with H1a, the coefficients for FGN_COMP are positive and significant for 
MCS_FORM (p < 0.01), MCS_PLAN (p < 0.015), MCS_TARGET (p < 0.05), MCS_TIGHT (p < 
0.05), , MCS_TARGET (p < 0.05), and MCS_PART (p < 0.1005).. These results provide support for 
H1a. Consistent with H1b, the coefficients for the INT_ORIENT  * FGN_COMP interaction are 
negative and significant for MCS_FORM (p < 0.015), MCS_TARGET (p < 0.01), MCS_TIGHT (p < 
0.05), and MCS_PART (p < 0.015). The coefficients for MCS_PLAN and MCS_TARGET are  not 
significant (p<0.1005). These results provide partial support for H1b.  
To probe deeper into the form of the interactions, we split our sample into two subsamples: 
domestic-oriented PLCs and international-oriented PLCs.  Our results are reported in Table 6. 
Consistent with H1b, for domestic-oriented firms, the coefficients for FGN_COMP are positive and 
significant for MCS_FORM (p < 0.01), MCS_PLAN (p < 0.01), MCS_TARGET (p < 0 .10), 
MCS_TIGHT (p < 0.01), and MCS_PART (p < 0.05). For international-oriented firms, the 
coefficient for FGN_COMP is positive and significant only for MCS_PLAN (p < 0.05), and 
negative and significant for MCS_PART (p < 0.10). The difference in the FGN_COMP coefficients 
between the domestic- and international-oriented firms is significant (p < 0.05).  
Consistent with H2, Table 5 shows that the coefficient for the INT_ORIENT * CUSTOMER 
interaction is positive and significant for MCS_FORM (p < 0.01), MCS_PLAN (p < 0.05), 
MCS_TARGET (p < 0.10), MCS_TIGHT (p < 0.05) and MCS_PART (p < 0.01). These results 
                                                                                                                                                            
1993). This estimation procedure assumes and estimates a common component of the variance and co-variance 
matrix for all observations from the same industry (StataCorp, 1999, p. 257).  
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provide support for H2. To probe deeper into the form of the interactions for H2, we also analyze 
and compare the results between the domestic-oriented and international-oriented PLCs (see Table 
6). Consistent with H2, for international-oriented firms, the coefficient for CUSTOMER is positive 
and significant for MCS_TIGHT (p < 0.05) and MCS_PART (p < 0.10). In contrast, and consistent 
with H2, for domestic-oriented firms, the coefficient for CUSTOMER is negative and significant for, 
MCS_PLAN (p < 0.10) and not significant (p < 0.10) for the other MCSs. The difference in the 
CUSTOMER coefficients between the domestic- and international-oriented firms is significant (p < 
0.05). 
Discussion and conclusion   
Management accounting research in transitional economies have focused on the foreign 
direct investment driven market competition determinants of use of “Western” management 
accounting and control systems. We extend this research by investigating the outward 
internationalization market driven determinants of use of “Western” management accounting and 
control systems. In particular, we investigate how the choice of management accounting and 
control systems is influenced by the type of market competition (foreign entrants’ competition 
and customer buying power) and the international orientation of the firm.  
With respect to the interactions between the type of market competition and market 
orientation, we find that the level of foreign entrants’ competition is positively associated with five 
out of five management control mechanisms. We also find that the association between foreign 
entrants’ competition and use of management control systems is significantly weaker for 
internationally oriented firms with respect to the use of formal procedures, approval procedures and 
participation in budget setting and performance evaluation. We explain this result is due to 
differences in the lack of alternatives available to domestically oriented firms places greater pressure 
on the firm to manage resources. We also find that the influence of the level of customer buying 
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power on the use of management control mechanisms is significantly stronger for internationally 
oriented firms for all five management control mechanisms. We explain this result is due to the 
greater resource (quality and price) demands that foreign customers place upon internationally 
oriented firms. 
Our study contributes to the management accounting and control literature in two ways.  
First, our study contributes to the growing body of research on the use of MCS in transitional 
economy firms (Anderson & Lanen, 1999; Chow et al., 2007; Firth, 1996; O’Connor et al., 2004, 
2006; Joshi, 2001; Luther & Longden, 2001; Lin & Yu, 2002; Szychta, 2002; Haldma & Laats, 
2002). Prior studies have examined the forces for change such as joint ventures, market 
competition, stock market listing, and government interference (eg. Anderson & Lanen, 1999; 
Firth, 1996; O’Connor et al.,2004, 2006; Chow et al., 2007). Our study confirms some of these 
findings, but in a more detailed way. That is, we show that the competitive pressures facing 
transitional economy firms depend on their domestic versus international orientation. According 
to Anderson and Lanen (1999), increasing competition is associated with increased customer 
prominence in planning and control processes and in organizational performance measurement. 
Our study partly confirms this finding, but we also provide evidence that the influence of 
customer buying power on the use of MCS depends on the firm’s domestic versus international 
orientation.   
Second, it contributes to the contingency literature that examines the association between 
market competition and the choice of management control systems (e.g., Khandwalla, 1972), the 
demand for accounting information (Libby and Waterhouse, 1996; Krishnan, 2005) and the 
experimental choice of level of product costing accuracy (Krishnan, 2002). Much of this research 
has examined the influence of competition on large developed nation firms. We show that the 
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influence of different types of market competition on the use of MCSs depends on the firm’s 
domestic versus international orientation.  
While, this study has provided new insights, it has only scratched the surface of this 
complex phenomenon. Our findings with respect to the focal variable (MCS) are based on 
managers’ perceptions and on what they chose to reveal through their responses. Aware of this, 
however, we attempted to cross validate such responses by having two senior managers respond 
to the same survey questions. We also were able to validate the responses of one variable 
(participation in budget setting and performance evaluation) with responses obtained from 
middle-level managers of the same firm. For the archival measures, we attempted to measure a 
type of market competition that is specific to emerging economy firms (foreign entrant 
competition), however, we were only able to measure this at the industry (and not firm) level. 
Similarly, for our proxy of international orientation, the use of an export % cut-off score, while 
consistent with the international business literature, may not actually reflect the full extent of 
international orientation of the firm.  We attempted to mitigate this narrow measure by gather 
more data: we contacted firms that were on either side of this cut off score and were able to 
validate the difference in terms of the whether a firms’ dominant customers are international or 
domestic.  
Finally, this study focuses only on publicly-listed Chinese firms, which presumably have 
advanced further along the reform process than their non-listed counterparts. Future research 
could extend this model to examine non-listed firms which may take a different path towards 
internationalization. For example, some firms begin their life with a high degree of born-
globalness which might impact on the choice and timing of use of different MCS. The model 
could also be extended to examine include the firms’ further examine the joint and interactive 
influences of market competition and international orientation, paying attention to government 
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support and influence. As governments of many emerging economies tend to support the 
outward internationalization of their flagship firms, it would be interesting to see how the use of 
MCS evolves in these firms compared with their more privatized counterparts.  
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Figure 1—Independent, Dependent, and Control Variables and Hypotheses 
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 Control 
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____________________________ 
 
 
Hypothesis 1a. The effect foreign entrants’ competition on the level of MCSs’ use by Chinese PLCs is positive. The 
MCSs include formalization of planning, strategic planning, budget controls, and participation in budget setting. 
 
Hypothesis 1b. The effect foreign entrants’ competition on the level of MCSs’ use by Chinese PLCs is stronger for 
domestic-oriented PLCs than for international-oriented PLCs. The MCSs include formalization of planning, 
strategic planning, budget controls, and participation in budget setting. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The effect of customers’ buying power on the level of MCSs’ use by Chinese PLCs is stronger for 
international-oriented PLCs than for domestic-oriented PLCs. These MCSs include formalization of planning, 
strategic planning, budget controls, and participation in budget setting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H1b (-) 
 
Foreign 
entrants’  
competition 
 
 
Customers’ 
buying 
power 
 
Domestic-oriented if 
export sales <25% of total 
firm sales (= 0); 
International-oriented if 
export sales > 25% of 
total firm sales (= 1) 
 
 
% of foreign firms’ 
sales revenue, out of 
total industry revenue 
 
 
Domestic vs. 
International 
Orientation 
 
MCSs 
 
Formal procedures (MCS_FORM) 
Strategic planning (MCS_PLAN) 
Approval procedures (MCS_TIGHT) 
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Control variables: 
 
Export intensity 
(EXPORT%) 
Export experience 
(EXPORT_YRS 
Joint venture experience (JV) 
Manufacturing vs retail 
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State ownership (STATE) 
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Industry growth (GROWTH) 
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Table 1. Sample Selection, and Tests of Respondent vs. Non-Respondent Firms 
   
 
Panel A: Sample selection  
  
Firms publicly listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange by end of 2003 759 
Firms publicly listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange by end of 2003 500 
Total number of publicly listed firms 1,259 
Less:  
Firms listed in 2003 (134) 
Firms listed in 2002     (  69) 
Non-manufacturing firms (376) 
Firms surveyed     680 
Less: Non-response firms    ( 497) 
Survey Response firms     183 
Less:  
Firms that returned incomplete questionnaires (14) 
Government protected firms, conglomerates (15) 
  
Final Sample Size a 154 
Domestic oriented Firms (<25% export sales) 
 (Firms with between 1% and <25% export sales = 41) 
121 
International oriented Firms (25% or >25% export sales) 33 
  
Panel B: Differences between Respondent and Non-Respondent Firms  
      
 Means    
 
Variable 
Respondent    
Firms 
Non-respondent 
firms 
Difference 
in Means 
t-test 
(Pr > t) 
Wilcoxon 
Test (Pr > z) 
SALES 
(million) 
180.76 176.61  0.42 0.34 0.64 
Net income 
(million) 176.74 181.35 (0.46) 0.33 0.44 
SIZE (# of 
Employees) 4122 4765 (643) 0.63 0.70 
AGE (in # 
years) 9.57  9.69  0.12 0.40 0.05 
      
 a  17 Industries were represented in the sample. The SIC code and number of representations (#) are: 
26-Raw Chemical (incl Petroleum Processing) (27), 34-Metal Products (16), 41-Electrical Machines, 
Electronic and Telecom Equipment (14), 37-Transport Equipment (13), 36-Special Equipment (13), 27-
Medical and Pharmaceutical Products (9), 31-Nonmetal Products (7), (30)-Plastic (7), 17-Textile (7), 
16-Tobacco Processing (16), 22-Papermaking & Printing (6), 13-Food Processing (6), 28-Chemical 
fiber (5), 14-Food Manufacturing (5), 42-Instruments, Cultural and Clerical (4), 35-Ordinary machinery 
(4), 15-Beverage (4).  
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Table 2. Confirmatory factor analysis of management accounting/controls (n=154) 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Formal Procedures (4 items), (MCS_FORM, Alpha = 0.89)  Senior-level managers  
To what extent does your company have rules, policies, and procedures that govern how the following types of 
activities are to be performed?  
Making strategic decisions regarding acquisitions, diversification, 
major new product introductions, long-term goals, etc? a 
0.86     
Making decisions relating to the day-to-day operations of the 
business, including equipment replacement, production 
planning, adjusting prices of goods, inventory purchases, hiring 
of lower level personnel, etc? a 
0.85     
Carrying out strategic decisions regarding acquisitions, 
diversification, major new product introductions, long-term 
goals, etc. a 
0.66     
Carrying out decision relations to the day-to-day operations of the 
business, including equipment replacement, production 
planning, adjusting prices of goods, inventory purchases, hiring 
of lower level personnel, etc. a 
0.62     
      
Strategy Planning (6 items), (MCS_PLAN, Alpha = 0.78)  Senior-level managers  
How extensive are your company’s strategic plans relating to 
acquisitions, diversification, major new product introductions, 
long-term goals, etc.? b 
 0.75    
How extensive are your company’s plans relating to day-to-day 
business operations, including equipment replacement, 
production planning, adjusting prices of goods, inventory 
purchases, hiring of lower level personnel, etc.? b 
 0.79    
How detailed are your company’s strategic plans relating to 
acquisitions, diversification, major new product introductions, 
long-term goals, etc.? b 
 0.34    
How detailed are your company’s plans relating to day-to-day 
business operations, including equipment replacement, 
production planning, adjusting prices of goods, inventory 
purchases, hiring of lower level personnel, etc.? b 
 0.54    
How far out in time does your company prepare strategic plans 
relating to acquisitions, diversification, major new product 
introductions, long-term goals, etc.? d 
 0.56    
How far out in time does your company prepare plans relating to 
day-to-day operations of the business, including equipment 
replacement, production planning, adjusting prices of goods, 
inventory purchases, hiring of lower level personnel, etc? d
 0.34    
      
Budget Targets (6 items), (MCS_TARGET, Alpha = 0.87) Senior-level managers  
Please rate the extent to which your company uses each of these control devices:  
Net income targets: a      
a)Annual   0.62   
b)Quarterly   0.86   
c)Monthly    0.79   
Discretionary program targets: a      
a)Total program expenditures    0.61   
b)Individual program expenditures   0.65   
Approvals are required for: a      
a)Formal reviews of responsibility center  performance   0.41   
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Table 2. Confirmatory factor analysis (n=154) (continued) 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Tightness of Controls (5 items) (MCS_TIGHT, Alpha = 0.78)  Middle-level managers  
Please rate the extent to which your company uses each of these control devices:  
Strict headcount targets a    0.39  
Please rate the extent to which approvals are required for 
each of the following: a 
     
a)Hiring new employees    0.76  
b)Spending discretionary program money already in the 
budget 
   0.64  
c)Spending discretionary program money in excess of 
budgeted levels 
   0.82  
d)Making capital expenditures    0.81  
      
Participation in budget setting (4 items), (MCS_PART, Alpha = 0.89)  Middle-level managers  
How much importance do superior typically place on 
subordinates’ explanations for their actual performance 
relative to the budget? (PPE) c 
    0.73 
How much overall influence do subordinates typically have 
in the determination of their budgets? (PB) c 
    0.78 
To what extent do superiors typically seek subordinates’ 
input in the budget preparation process? (PB) c 
    0.82 
How much importance do superiors typically place on not 
finalizing subordinates’ budgets until the latter fully agree 
with them? (PB) c 
    0.82 
How much importance do superior typically place on 
subordinates’ level of agreement with the evaluation of 
their actual performance relative to the budget before 
concluding the evaluation process?(PPE) c 
    0.85 
How much importance do superiors typically place on 
subordinates’ suggestions concerning how to revise the 
latter’s budget? (PB) c 
    0.80 
To what extent do superiors typically seek subordinates’ 
opinion when evaluating the latter’s actual performance 
relative to the budget?(PPE) c 
    0.82 
      
Eigenvalues 1.44 1.36 2.39 2.56 10.62 
      
a1 = Not used at all; 4 = Used moderately; 7 = Used very extensively 
b1= Not at all Extensive; 7= Extremely Extensive 
c1 = Extremely low; 4 = Moderate; 7 = Extremely high 
d1= One month or Less; 2= One Quarter; 3= Half a Year; 4= A Year; 5= 3-5 Years; 6= >5 Years 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (n=154) a 
  
 Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
Theoretical 
Range 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
 MCSs:      
MCS_FORM 19.56(20.32) 3.94(3.79) 6-42 4.00(7.00) 25.00(28.00) 
MCS_PLAN 28.56(28.33) 4.35(4.04) 5-35 16.00(10.50) 38.00(38.00) 
MCS_TARGET 33.68(33.45) 6.42(5.22) 6-42 16.00(16.00) 42.00(42.00) 
MCS_TIGHT 26.54(26.34) 4.97(3.96) 5-35 10.00(18.00) 34.50(35.00) 
MCS_PART 33.31(32.46) 6.74(6.15) 7-49 7.00(15.50) 43.50(46.00) 
Independent 
Variables: 
     
CUSTOMER 28.27% (29.16%) 16.13(20.10) 0-100 6.00(4.00) 61.00(94.00) 
FGN_COMP 18.99% (19.01%) 17.71(18.51) 0-100 1.45(0.00) 53.54(67.27) 
INT_ORIENT 0.21 0.42 0-1 0.00 1.00 
Control Variables:       
EXPORT% 43.08% (3.08%)‡ 19.16(5.73) 0-100 21.81(0.00) 90.77(19.82) 
EXPORT_YRS 4.78(1.65) ‡ 1.21(2.03)  1.00(0.00) 7.00(7.00) 
JV 0.18(0.10) 0.39(0.30) 0-1 0.00(0.00) 1.00(1.00) 
BTB 0.54(0.47) 0.51(0.50) 0-1 0.00(0.00) 1.00(1.00) 
STATE 39.18(38.44) 25.85(25.88) 0-100 0.00(0.00) 75.00(84.99) 
SIZE 21.41(21.31) 0.85(0.93)  19.72(19.49) 23.15(24.88) 
GROWTH  113.79(114.21) 107.79(82.13)  -77.00(-77.00) 275.16(275.16) 
a    All within-organization measures related to the divisional cost/profit center manager level; n=154 
b      Significance levels: ‡ p < 0.01, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (two-tailed).  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
Variable definitions: 
 
MCSs:  
MCS_FORM 
Formulization of planning is an aggregate measure that combines the responses 
from senior-level managers to four questions about the extensiveness of use of 
rules, policies, and procedures to govern various strategic and operational 
decisions in the firm (see Table 2).  
MCS_PLAN 
Strategic planning is an aggregate measure that combines the responses from the 
senior-level managers to five questions related to strategic planning procedures 
(see Table 2). 
MCS_TARGET 
Budget control is an aggregate measure that combines the responses from the 
senior-level managers to six questions related to budget setting and targets (see 
Table 2). 
MCS_TIGHT 
Tightness of control is an aggregate measure that combines the responses from the 
senior-level managers to five questions related to budget setting and targets (see 
Table 2). 
MCS_PART Participation in budget setting is an aggregate measure that combines the responses to seven questions elicited from the senior-level managers (see Table 2). 
  
Independent Variables: 
CUSTOMER  Customers’ buying power: the percentage of sales, out of total firm sales, made to 
the five largest customers of each firm in 2003. The higher the index, the higher is 
the level of customers’ buying power  (source: CSMAR database). 
FGN_COMP Foreign entrants’ competition: the percentage of foreign firm’s sales revenue, out 
of total industry revenue, in each of China’s domestic industries using the two-digit 
CSMAR code (2003). 
INT_ORIENT Domestic vs. international orientation: we use an indicator variable to denote that 
the firm is either domestic-oriented, that is, has no export sales (coded as 0), or 
international-oriented, with export sales exceeding 25% of total sales (coded as 1), 
based on the average percentage of the firm’s export sales for the year 2002-2003. 
We use this variable for modeling the interaction terms in equation 1 (source: 
CSMAR database). 
Control Variables:  
 EXPORT% Export intensity: the average percentage of overseas sales, out of the firm’s total 
sales, for the year 2003 (source: CSMAR database). 
EXPORT_YRS 
 
Number of years since the firm began exporting (source: CSMAR database). 
JV Joint venture experience - coded as 1 if the firm currently has joint venture experience with a foreign partner and 0 otherwise. 
BTB Firm main customers as being manufacturers or retailers – coded as 1 if the firm sells to manufacturers and 0 if the firm sells to retailers. 
STATE Government ownership: we use an indicator variable to denote whether the firm’s 
major shareholder is either a private institutional investor (coded as 1), or the 
government (coded as 0) at the end of 2003 (source: CSMAR database). 
SIZE Size: based on the average natural log of total assets at the end of 2002 and 2003. 
GROWTH 
 
Industry growth: based on the average annual industry sales growth between 1999 
and 2003 (source: China Statistical Yearbook). 
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Table 4. Pearson Correlation Statistics of the MCS and Independent Variables (n = 154) 
 
 
    
 
 Independent Variables 
Correlations 
MCS_ 
FORM 
MCS_ 
PLAN 
MCS_ 
TARGET 
MCS_ 
TIGHT 
MCS_ 
PART 
CUSTOM
ER 
FGN_ 
COMP 
INT_ORI
ENT 
EXPOR
T 
YREXP
ORT 
JV BTB STATE SIZE 
MCS_PLAN 0.5924‡              
MCS_TARGET 0.5245‡ 0.4743‡             
MCS_TIGHT 0.3175‡ 0.3183‡ 0.5602‡            
MCSPART 0.444‡ 0.4773‡ 0.491‡ 0.388‡           
CUSTOMER -0.0245 -0.1289 -0.0239 0.054 -0.028          
FGN_COMP 0.1566 0.1664† 0.0388 0.1014 0.0642 0.0469         
INT_ORIENT -0.0831 0.0231 0.0167 0.0195 0.0563 -0.0191 -0.0005        
EXPORT% -0.0441 -0.0193 -0.0115 -0.0091 0.089 0.047 0.029 0.6517‡       
EXPORT_YRS -0.0087 0.0321 0.0483 0.1012 0.1931† -0.1213 -0.0248 0.5652‡ 0.6847‡      
JV 0.0061 0.0157 0.055 0.0023 0.1642† -0.0257 0.0153 0.1022 0.1322 0.0568     
BTB 0.0249 0.0563 -0.0752 -0.0492 -0.043 0.2917‡ -0.0091 0.0548 0.0146 0.0135 -0.1211    
STATE 0.1026 0.1201 0.0427 0.0586 0.0435 0.1829† 0.0318 0.012 -0.0327 -0.0133 -0.2518‡ 0.0542   
SIZE 0.1881† 0.2212‡ 0.1359* 0.0992 0.2305‡ -0.0669 -0.0975 0.0427 0.0128 0.1342* 0.0202 0.0666 0.1516*  
GROWTH 0.1005 0.1216 0.0171 0.0224 0.0871 -0.0010 .0059 -0.0019 -0.0303 -0.0172 0.0354 -0.0708 0.1989 0.3372‡ 
1      Significance levels: ‡ p < 0.01, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (two-tailed). The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
2    See Table 2 for variable definitions; additional definitions below. 
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Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions to Test H1 and H2 (n = 154)1 2 
 
 MCS1….5 =  β0  + β1 FGN_COMP it + β2 CUSTOMER it + β3 INT_ORIENT it + β4 EXPORT%it 
                     + β5 EXPORT_YRSit  + β6 JV it + β7 BTB it + β8 STATE it + β9 SIZE it  + β10GROWTH it 
+ β11 (INT_ORIENT it * FGN_COMP it)  + β12 (INT_ORIENT it * CUSTOMER it) + eit.     (1) 
 
 Hypothe
ses 
MCS_ 
FORM 
MCS_PL
AN 
MCS_ 
TARGET 
MCS_ 
TIGHT 
MCS_PA
RT 
MCS_ 
FORM 
MCS_ 
PLAN 
MCS_ 
TARGET 
MCS_ 
TIGHT 
MCS_ 
PART 
FGN_COMP H1a(+) .05‡ 
(3.01) 
.07‡ 
(4.46) 
.05† 
(2.34) 
.05† 
(2.64) 
.06* 
(1.94) 
.06‡ 
(4.18) 
.04* 
(1.97) 
.06* 
(1.92) 
.08‡ 
(4.09) 
.1‡ 
(2.99) 
CUSTOMER  -.004 
(-.29) 
-.03 
(-1.71) 
.02 
(.75) 
.03 
(1.63) 
-.001 
(-.05) 
-.02† 
(-2.24) 
-.04 
(-1.48) 
-.02 
(-.88) 
.01 
(.57) 
-.01 
(-.65) 
INT_ORIENT  -.44 
(-.33) 
2.07 
(1.34) 
3.01 
(.9) 
2.92† 
(2.52) 
1 
(.37) 
-1.96† 
(-2.93) 
-1.07 
(-.92) 
2.85 
(1.65) 
2.42† 
(2.14) 
1.2 
(.5) 
INT_ORIENT * FGN_COMP H1b(-)      -.09‡ 
(-3.67) 
.02 
(.42) 
-.1‡ 
(-3.11) 
-.1† 
(-2.31) 
-.2‡ 
(-3.14) 
INT_ORIENT* CUSTOMER H2(+)      .07‡ 
(3.09) 
.06† 
(2.23) 
.09* 
(1.96) 
.11† 
(2.78) 
.17‡ 
(3.54) 
EXPORT%  .001 
(.02) 
-.04 
(-1.29) 
-.07 
(-1.1) 
-.09† 
(-2.23) 
-.03 
(-.72) 
.02 
(.75) 
-.02 
(-.8) 
-.1† 
(-2.38) 
-.12‡ 
(-3.71) 
-.1† 
(-2.62) 
EXPORT_YRS  -.01 
(-.1) 
.02 
(.11) 
.22 
(.9) 
.44* 
(2.12) 
.6‡ 
(3.37) 
.02 
(.22) 
-.005 
(-.03) 
.36* 
(1.86) 
.48† 
(2.89) 
.76‡ 
(3.52) 
JV  .2 
(.24) 
.56 
(.77) 
.92 
(.85) 
-.05 
(-.04) 
3.38† 
(2.58) 
-.15 
(-.22) 
.38 
(.45) 
1.26 
(1.4) 
-.5 
(-.65) 
2.59* 
(2.06) 
BTB  .09 
(.18) 
.49 
(1.08) 
-1.32 
(-1.51) 
-.93 
(-1.37) 
-.46 
(-.66) 
-.31 
(-.62) 
1.1* 
(2.05) 
-1.28 
(-1.66) 
-.85 
(-1.6) 
-.99 
(-1.18) 
STATE   .01 
(.73) 
.02 
(.96) 
.01 
(.33) 
.001 
(.09) 
.02 
(.83) 
.01 
(.95) 
.01 
(.51) 
.01 
(.31) 
.004 
(.35) 
.02 
(1.12) 
SIZE  .76* 
(2.04) 
.94 
(1.67) 
.88† 
(2.33) 
.39 
(1.27) 
1.48† 
(2.77) 
.65‡ 
(2.99) 
1.09† 
(2.76) 
.9* 
(1.95) 
.47* 
(1.97) 
1.51‡ 
(3) 
GROWTH  .0002 
(.08) 
.001 
(.44) 
-.004 
(-1.08) 
-.002 
(-.66) 
-.002 
(-.58) 
.002 
(.81) 
.004 
(1.71) 
.004 
(1.23) 
.004 
(1.56) 
.002 
(.56) 
CONSTANT  2.73 
(.33) 
6.55 
(.55) 
13.08 
(1.63) 
16.46† 
(2.42) 
-5 
(-.41) 
5.65 
(1.14) 
3.82 
(.46) 
12.25 
(1.28) 
14.34‡ 
(3.17) 
-5.52 
(-.48) 
            
Model F  8.02‡ 11.17‡ 8.81‡ 4.55‡ 2.91† 42.59‡ 14.31‡ 12.63‡ 27.53‡ 13.07‡ 
Adjusted R2  0.11 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.27 0.18 0.17 0.24 0.25 
Maximum VIF  5.16 5.20 5.22 3.92 5.17 6.67 6.75 7.26 7.47 6.57 
Condition Index  24.68 30.16 25.60 26.87 22.72 26.09 35.88 27.73 35.29 25.57 
1      Significance levels: ‡ p < 0.01, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (two-tailed). The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
2    See Table 2 for variable definitions; additional definitions below. 
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Table 6. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions 
- Split between domestic- (DOM, n = 121) and internationally-oriented (INT, n = 33) firms 1, 2 
 
MCS1….5 =  β0  + β1 FGN_COMP it + β2 CUSTOMER it + β3 INT_ORIENT it + β4 EXPORT%it 
 + β5 EXPORT_YRSit  + β6 JV it + β7 BTB it + β8 STATE it + β9 SIZE it  + β10GROWTH it  + eit.   (2) 
 
 Hypotheses MCS_FORM MCS_PLAN MCS_TARGET MCS_TIGHT MCS_PART 
  DOM INT DOM INT DOM INT DOM INT DOM INT 
FGN_COMP + (DOM) 
.07‡ 
(3.09) 
.05 
(.78) 
.07‡ 
(4.16) 
.12† 
(2.97) 
.05* 
(2.1) 
.05 
(.64) 
.07‡ 
(3.93) 
-.06 
(-.62) 
.1† 
(2.76) 
-.15* 
(-1.99) 
CUSTOMER +  (INT) 
-.001 
(-.06) 
-.02 
(-.78) 
-.03* 
(-1.59) 
-.02 
(-.38) 
.004 
(.18) 
.06 
(1.23) 
.02 
(.79) 
.13† 
(3.01) 
-.002 
(-.1) 
.06* 
(2.12) 
EXPORT   
-.08 
(-1.02) 
.003 
(.06) 
-.04 
(-.46) 
-.09* 
(-1.95) 
-.14 
(-1.38) 
-.08* 
(-1.84) 
-.11* 
(-1.81) 
-.08* 
(-1.82) 
-.17 
(-1.71) 
-.04 
(-.93) 
EXPORT_YRS  
.14 
(.83) 
.05 
(.09) 
.02 
(.11) 
-.01 
(-.02) 
.53* 
(1.92) 
-.17 
(-.13) 
.54† 
(2.67) 
-.3 
(-.46) 
.89† 
(2.83) 
.5 
(.34) 
JV  
-.25 
(-.19) 
.74 
(.91) 
.15 
(.15) 
1.78 
(1.48) 
.73 
(.86) 
.58 
(.36) 
.45 
(.36) 
.06 
(.02) 
2.73 
(1.7) 
2.8 
(1.32) 
BTB  
-.65 
(-1.02) 
2.02 
(1.36) 
.5 
(.76) 
1.02 
(.54) 
-2.06* 
(-1.91) 
.35 
(.11) 
-1.23* 
(-1.77) 
-2.45 
(-.85) 
-1.68 
(-1.69) 
-.98 
(-.44) 
STATE  
.01 
(.15) 
.01 
(.5) 
.01 
(.76) 
-.01 
(-.23) 
-.01 
(-.54) 
.02 
(.61) 
-.01 
(-.35) 
.02 
(.39) 
-.01 
(-.17) 
.07* 
(1.82) 
SIZE  
1.05† 
(2.51) 
.21 
(.28) 
1.28* 
(1.86) 
-.62 
(-.65) 
1.03* 
(1.87) 
1.72 
(1.66) 
.54 
(1.52) 
.64 
(.77) 
1.82† 
(2.7) 
1.34 
(1.56) 
GROWTH  
.003 
(.76) 
-.005 
(-.85) 
.001 
(0) 
-.001 
(-.02) 
.002 
(.36) 
-.02 
(-1.75) 
.003 
(.56) 
-.005 
(-.44) 
.01 
(1.42) 
-.01 
(-1.32) 
CONSTANT  
-2.8 
(-.32) 
13.3 
(.84) 
-.03 
(-0.00) 
42.62* 
(2.12) 
10.58 
(.93) 
-1.1 
(-.04) 
12.72* 
(1.82) 
16.16 
(.74) 
-12.16 
(-.84) 
1.08 
(.05) 
            
Model F  2.30* 3.98† 5.57† 13.67† 3.85‡ 4.29† 5.62‡ 13.01‡ 8.01‡ 110.74‡ 
Adjusted R2  0.15 0.18 0.19 0.34 0.10 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.25 0.31 
Maximum VIF  2.28 2.99 2.18 2.88 2.20 4.37 2.28 2.37 2.30 3.51 
Condition Index  25.39 34.26 31.36 40.32 28.03 38.79 28.23 30.93 23.84 35.23 
1      Significance levels: ‡ p < 0.01, † p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (two-tailed). The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
2    See Table 2 for variable definitions; additional definitions below. 
 
 
 
